This paper provides an analysis of the long-run actuarial effects of four significant Social Security reform plans and their effects on representative workers. The reform plans include three plans establishing private accounts: the Social Security Guarantee Plan (proposed by Representatives Bill Archer and Clay Shaw), the Social Security Solvency Act of 1999 (Senator Moynihan), and the Bipartisan Social Security Reform Act of 1999 (Senators Gregg, Breaux, Kerrey, and others)
INTRODUCTION
T his report provides an analysis of the effect of four major Social Security reform plans on the long-run solvency of the Social Security Trust Fund and the distributional effects of these reform plans on representative workers. The plans span a variety of ideas that have been suggested for Social Security reform, including the establishment of private accounts, providing for Trust Fund investment in private securities, using General Fund revenues, and changing the benefit structure of Social Security retirement benefits.
Most observers agree that the Social Security system is in need of reform. Under current projections of the Board of Trustees of Social Security, the Social Security Trust Fund will be depleted by 2037. Maintaining solvency over the next 75 years is estimated to require program changes equivalent to an immediate increase in the payroll tax of about two percentage points or an immediate reduction in all benefit payments of almost 15 percent. Failure to begin to undertake necessary changes now will result in the need for more substantial changes in the future. 1 It is likely that any consensus plan adopted to provide for the long-run solvency of the Trust Fund will borrow from elements of the four plans considered in this report. Each of the plans considered below achieves long-range (75-year) actuarial balance for the Social Security Trust Fund under the demographic and economic assumptions generally employed by the Trustees of the Social Security system. Actuarial balance is the traditional test of solvency used by the Trustees of Social Security to ensure that resources of the Trust Fund are sufficient to pay benefits.
The plans considered are:
• The Social Security Guarantee Plan designed by Representatives Bill Archer and Clay Shaw, which relies primarily on General Fund transfers to private accounts and equity investments to achieve long-range actuarial balance of the Social Security Trust Fund. • A reform package modeled after proposals of President Clinton, which relies primarily on General Fund transfers to the Trust Fund. The Administration proposals (H.R. 3165 and the President's FY 2001 Budget proposal) differ in whether Trust Fund investments are made in equities. Both proposals are modified in this analysis to include other changes necessary to achieve longrange actuarial balance. The proposals are referred to in this analysis as the Trust Fund Investment Plans.
• The Social Security Solvency Act of 1999 (S. 21) introduced by Senator Moynihan, which uses a mixture of changes in benefits and payroll taxes to achieve long-range actuarial balance. Social Security benefits would be supplemented by distributions from private accounts; and • The Bipartisan Social Security Reform Act of 1999 (S. 1383) of Senators Gregg, Breaux, Kerrey, and others, which makes a variety of changes to benefits and uses private accounts to achieve long-range actuarial balance.
SUMMARY OF REFORM PLANS
The four reform plans are summarized in this section. Two side-by-side tables ( Table 1 and Table 2 ) are also provided to highlight and compare the major elements of each of the reform plans.
Social Security Guarantee Plan (Archer/Shaw)
The Social Security Guarantee Plan restores solvency of the Trust Fund by relying on revenues from the General Fund to finance private accounts for individuals, and investments of these funds at rates of return in excess of those on government securities. Distributions from an individual's private account would result in a dollar-for-dollar reduction of the individual's Social Security benefit.
The government contribution to private accounts would be equal to 2 percent of the individual's wages (up to the maximum Social Security wage base). 2 In 2000, 1 There is not universal agreement that Social Security reform is necessary to resolve the estimated actuarial imbalance. Baker and Weisbrot (1999) argue that the Trustees intermediate set of assumptions are in fact "pessimistic" and reform, if eventually required, can be put off for future generations. Indeed, under the explicitly optimistic set of assumptions in the 2000 Trustees Report, Social Security remains in actuarial balance throughout the 75-year forecast period. In contrast, Kotlikoff (1998) argues that even the intermediate assumptions of the Trustees are overly optimistic. Under his preferred demographic and economic assumptions and accounting for deficits beyond the 75-year forecast period, Kotlikoff forecasts an "open-ended" actuarial deficit three times larger than the intermediate forecast reported by the Trustees. 2 In 2000, the Social Security maximum wage base is $76,200. The amount is indexed annually for growth in average wages.
the aggregate government contribution to private accounts would total about $75 billion. Over the next 75 years the cumulative government contribution would total about $41 trillion, with a present value of $3 trillion. The individual accounts would be required to be invested in a diversified portfolio of publicly traded securities. Investors would be required to hold portfolios comprised of 60 percent corporate equity and 40 percent corporate bonds.
Upon retirement, benefits from the private accounts would be integrated with the normal Social Security benefit. We refer to this integration formula as an offset. Under the integration formula, Social Security benefits would be reduced dollar-for-dollar (but not below zero) by the annuitized value of distributions from the private account. As a result of this offset, individuals would be entitled to total retirement benefits equal to the greater of their present-law Social Security benefit or the benefit payable from their private account.
The proposal provides for a reduction in payroll tax rates beginning in 2050. Our modeling of the proposal makes any payroll tax reduction contingent on the existence of an actuarial surplus over the 75year forecast period.
The proposal also repeals the earnings test effective in 2006 for all beneficiaries age 62 or older.
The Social Security Guarantee Plan makes no other changes to the structure of Social Security benefits. As a result, under this plan all Social Security beneficiaries receive a benefit that is no less than the present-law benefit at the time of their retirement.
Trust Fund Investment Plans
The Administration in its FY2001 Budget, released in February 2000, proposed investing up to 15 percent of the Trust Fund in equities and transferring additional resources from the General Fund to the Social Security Trust Fund to improve its solvency. An earlier Administration proposal, submitted in legislation as H.R. 3165 in October 1999, provided for General Fund transfers but no Trust Fund investment in equities.
Under both of these proposals, an amount equal to the interest earnings on the Social Security surpluses during the period 2000-16 would be transferred from the General Fund to the Social Security Trust Fund during the period 2011-16. Between 2017-44, an amount equal to the transfer in 2016 would be credited to the Trust Fund each year. The Social Security Administration estimates that this would result in the following dollar amounts being transferred from the General Fund to Social Security: $107.3 billion in 2011, $124.9 billion in 2012, $145.2 billion in 2013, $167.1 billion in 2014, $190.7 billion in 2015, and $215.5 billion annually between 2016 and 2044. In aggregate, nearly $7 trillion dollars would be transferred between 2011 and 2044, with a present value of $1.4 trillion.
Under the assumptions of the 1999 Trustees Report, this significant transfer of funds to Social Security would delay the date of exhaustion of the Trust Funds from 2034 to 2050 (without equity investments) and by several more years if Trust Fund investments earned a higher return than on government securities. 3 In order to achieve long-range (75-year) actuarial balance, the Administration proposals would have to be modified to include additional revenue sources or reductions in benefits.
This report considers a set of modifications to the Administration proposals that are sufficient to achieve long-range actuarial balance. The modifications are based on earlier proposals contained in the report of the 1994-96 Social Security Advisory Council (1997) . The Administration proposals, as amended with these modifications, are referred to in this report as the Trust Fund Investment Plans.
The modifications would: (i) include all newly hired State and local workers under Social Security beginning in 2000; (ii) increase the taxable wage base for Social Security to 90 percent of covered earnings (phased in over 2000-10 and maintained thereafter); and (iii) accelerate the increase in the normal retirement age to 67 by 2011 and increase it further by one month every two years. The plans are modeled in this analysis with and without equity investments.
Under current law, the wage base, which includes wages up to $76,200 in 2000, is about 85 percent of covered earnings, and this percentage is forecast to decline to 84 percent by 2073. Under the proposal to increase the taxable wage base to 90 percent of covered earnings, the wage base would increase in 2010 (when fully phased in) from an estimated $110,000 under current law to about $196,000. High-income workers earning more than $110,000 would pay additional OASDI payroll taxes under the proposal, but they would also receive higher disability and retirement benefits since they would be credited with the additional earnings on which taxes were paid.
Under current law, the normal retirement age increases to age 66 (for workers turning age 62) in 2005 and is unchanged until 2017. The proposal increases the normal retirement age from 66 to 67 between 2005 and 2011. Further increases in the normal retirement age beyond age 67 under the proposal occur at the rate of one month every two years for the remainder of the 75-year forecast period.
Social Security Solvency Act of 1999 (S. 21, Senator Moynihan)
Senator Moynihan introduced a new, major reform plan for Social Security in January 1999. The plan generally relies on benefit reductions to achieve long-run solvency, but also provides for voluntary, supplementary private accounts.
Like a 1998 proposal by Senator Moynihan, the most striking feature of this plan is that payroll tax rates would be reduced by 2 percentage points-from 12.4 percent to 10.4 percent-between 2002 and 2029. After 2029, payroll tax rates would rise, increasing to 13.7 percent by 2060.
The plan also provides for voluntary private investment accounts. Effectively, the reduction in the payroll tax rate until 2029 would allow the investment account to be funded at no additional cost to the employee and employer relative to present-law payroll tax rates. The voluntary investment account would permit workers to contribute one percent of wages and these contributions would be matched by an equal contribution from the employer. Unlike other proposals establishing private accounts considered in this report, under Senator Moynihan's proposal, distributions from the investment accounts would not cause any reduction in Social Security benefits.
The plan establishes "KidSave" Accounts, under which a General Fund contribution would be made to a private account established for children at birth and on each of their first five birthdays. The cumulative amount contributed would initially be $3,500, but this amount would be indexed over time. Distributions from KidSave accounts would be treated like distributions from private accounts and would not reduce Social Security benefits.
Although the net effect of the changes to the payroll tax rate noted above is to increase the long-range actuarial deficit of the Trust Fund, the plan has a number of other provisions that would be sufficient to provide for its long-run solvency. These include:
( The Bipartisan Social Security Reform Plan (S. 1383), introduced in the Senate by Senators Gregg, Breaux, Kerry, Grassley, Thompson, Robb, and Thomas, is a significant revision of a plan proposed by the National Commission on Retirement Policy in 1998.
The plan would establish private accounts to be funded by redirecting two percentage points of the Social Security payroll tax. The reduction in Trust Fund contributions from the redirection of payroll taxes to private accounts would be made up through various provisions reducing benefit payments, offsetting a portion of Social Security benefits against private account benefits, and transferring amounts from the General Fund.
The plan would affect benefits in a number of ways, including one feature increasing the progressivity of Social Security benefits.
The specific elements of the Bipartisan Plan include:
(1) Reducing the Cost-of-Living Adjustment (COLA) by 0.5 percentage points effective in 2000 (or, if greater, the amount reflecting bias in the CPI to be published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics). This reduction would additionally be applied to the federal income tax and other federal programs, resulting in increased tax collections and reduced expenditures.
(2) Increasing the number of years considered in the benefit computation formula to include all years of earnings for purposes of determining cumulative earnings. Average annual earnings would be computed by dividing cumulative earnings by 40 years. The provision would phase in between 2002 and 2010. The provision generally reduces average indexed monthly earnings. Current law would be retained for the lower earner of a married couple. (3) Accelerating the normal retirement age to 67 for those turning 62 in 2011. After 2011, benefits would be reduced in a manner similar to a further increase in the normal retirement age to 68 by 2017 and increasing to age 70 by 2065 and in later years. These changes after 2011 would be achieved by reducing the Primary Insurance by 1.2 percent annually between 2012 and 2017 and by 0.3 percent annually after 2017 until 2065. (4) Increasing the actuarial reduction for early retirement and increasing the delayed retirement credit for retirement after the normal retirement age as follows: By 2005, benefits would be reduced by 25/36 percent for each month of early retirement within the first three years of the normal retirement age (relative to 20/36 percent under current law); additional months of early retirement beyond the first three years would result in a benefit reduction of 1/2 percent (relative to 5/12 percent under current law). The delayed retirement credit would be increased to 5/6 percent per month of delayed retirement by 2013 (relative to 4/6 percent in that year under current law).
(5) Increasing and maintaining the Social Security maximum wage base at 86 percent of covered wages. In 2000, this would increase the taxable wage base to $77,179 (relative to $76,200 in that year under current law). (6) Increasing the benefit computation formula for low-income earners by adding an additional bendpoint in the computation of the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA), offset by a reduction in the PIA of high-income earners (phased in 2006-15). (7) Redirecting transfers of income tax revenue from the taxation of a portion of Social Security benefits from the Hospital Insurance Trust Fund to the Social Security OASDI Trust Fund (phased in 2005-14). (8) Providing that a surviving spouse would receive a benefit not less than 75 percent of the benefit paid to the couple if both were living (phased in 2001-50). (9) Establishing private accounts funded through a redirection of 2 percentage points of payroll taxes beginning in 2000. Private accounts would be integrated with the normal Social Security retirement benefit through an offset formula. Under the offset formula, the worker's Primary Insurance Amount would be reduced by an amount attributable to the foregone tax revenues and a portion of the foregone interest accumulations resulting from the redirection of the two percentage points of payroll taxes. The offset amount would be equal to the hypothetical annuity that could be paid if amounts credited to the private account had been invested at an interest rate equal to the growth in average annual wages. 5 The offset amount would not depend on the actual rate of return earned in the private account. If the size of the offset is considered relative to the private account distribution, the offset for workers who are presently close to retirement at the start-up of this system would be larger relative to their private account distributions than for younger workers. The offset essentially recaptures the initial redirected payroll tax revenues (and the portion of the investment return comparable to the nominal wage growth), leaving workers with the investment return earned by the private account in excess of the nominal growth in wages. Because these older workers have fewer years to accumulate investment earnings on the amounts contributed to their private accounts, the offset is a larger proportion of their private account distributions.
Finally, low-income workers would be eligible for 100 percent matching contributions plus $100 for additional voluntary contributions to the private account. (10) Transferring revenues from the General Fund to the Social Security Trust Fund in amounts equal to 0.6 percent of taxable payroll (between 2000 and 2019), 0.8 percent of taxable payroll (between 2020 and 2039), 1.0 percent of taxable payroll (between 2040 and 2059), and 1.2 percent of taxable payroll (after 2060). These transfers are described as a "recapture of CPI reform revenues," i.e., a recapture of the addition in non-Social Security federal resources resulting from the reduced cost-of-livingadjustment. Over the 2000-73 pe-5 The rate of return used for purposes of calculating the offset is equal to the growth in nominal wages until the individual is eligible for retirement and uses the anticipated return on Trust Fund investments after the age of eligibility. Because the projected growth rate in nominal wages is less than the assumed nominal interest rate on government bonds, in present value the benefit reduction is less than the foregone Trust Fund tax revenues and interest earnings. riod, the cumulative General Fund transfer (and redirected transfers from the Hospital Insurance Trust Fund, described in item 7) would total about $31 trillion, with a present value of $1.7 trillion. (11) Repealing the earnings test beginning in 2003 for beneficiaries age 62 and older. (12) Establishing "KidSave" Accounts, under which a General Fund contribution would be made to a private account established for children at birth and on each of their first five birthdays. The cumulative amount contributed would initially be $3,500, but this amount would be indexed over time. Distributions from these accounts would be permitted during retirement and Social Security benefits would be reduced by one-half of the amount of the distributions from these accounts.
MODELING CHANGES TO SOCIAL SECURITY
The four proposals are analyzed with the Actuarial Research Corporation Social Security Model. This simulation model is patterned after ones used by the Office of the Actuary of the Social Security Administration. The Model can produce cost estimates and benefit information for a wide range of potential changes to current law for each year in a 75-year projection period. Model output includes effects of a proposal on the long-run actuarial balance, and annual measures of Trust Fund balances, receipts, aggregate benefit payments, and effects on benefits of sample workers. 6 The Model is benchmarked to the annual Trustees Report assumptions. Analysis in this paper is based on the 1999 Trustees Report assumptions. Using the demographic assumptions underlying the Trustees Report, the population is pre-dicted by age and sex for each year in the 75-year projection period. The number of covered workers in each age-sex-year cell is estimated as well as the number of beneficiaries in each cell for each type of benefit and age at entitlement. Workers and beneficiaries are assumed to adjust their behavior in response to changes in law. For example, an increase in the retirement age is modeled by decreasing the number of retired workers at ages below the new retirement age, with partially offsetting increases in the number of disabled workers below the retirement age.
Benefits are calculated based on the economic assumptions in the Trustees Report and 140 simulated workers. The simulated workers represent a distribution of the working population by ten earnings categories, seven lengths of service, and by sex. The earnings categories are obtained from a distribution of earnings for covered workers by sex in 1992. The seven lengths of service are obtained from Office of the Actuary data for retirees in 1996, by sex and age at entitlement. Work histories are derived by assuming smooth earnings patterns for the ten earnings categories throughout each of the seven lengths of service.
Based on the 140 simulated case histories, the Model calculates the average benefit amount for new retired workers and new disabled workers and benchmarks these amounts to match current law projections by the Office of the Actuary for each year, sex, and age at entitlement.
Model output is also provided for the three example worker categories shown in the annual Trustees Report, representing low, average, and maximum taxable earnings levels. The low earner has income equal to 45 percent of the average worker for a full working career. The average earner has the average wage in all years. The maximum earner earns the maximum taxable wage on which contri-bution and benefits are based. In 1999, the assumed average wage is $29,732, the low wage is $13,380, and the maximum wage is $72,600.
Recent research reviewed by the 1999 Technical Panel to the Social Security Advisory Board (1999) has indicated that by assuming steady earnings histories, these example workers traditionally used to depict benefit levels in the annual Trustees reports do not represent "typical" workers. For example, Bosworth, Burtless, and Steuerle (1999) estimate that when account is taken for actual variations in individual earnings profiles, including absences from the labor force, the average male earner has an average indexed monthly earnings (AIME) 25 percent less than the average computed on the basis of the steady earnings profile. They estimate that the average female earner has an AIME 40 percent less than the average steady earner. Based on their estimates, the actual average earner has an AIME about halfway between the hypothetical steady low earner and the steady average earner. The low and average workers shown in this report may then represent an income range about 20 percent below to 20 percent above the true average worker on a lifetime basis.
The Model does not provide for any macroeconomic feedback effects from a reform proposal. As a result, the economic assumptions of the Trustees Report are maintained for all proposals. 7
EFFECTS ON LONG-RUN SOLVENCY
The 1999 Report of the Board of Trustees of Social Security estimated that over the 1999-2073 period the combined Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance Trust Fund would have a long-range actuarial deficit equal to 2.07 percent of taxable payroll. This deficit can be corrected through a variety of measures, including payroll tax increases, benefit cuts, or General Fund contributions. 8 None of the reforms contemplated in this report rely exclusively on higher payroll taxes to restore long-run solvency, and three of the plans actually reduce payroll taxes directed to the Trust Funds. The manner in which these plans balance revenue increases against benefit reductions to eliminate the long-run Trust Fund imbalance is examined in this section.
Economic Assumptions
The analysis principally uses the intermediate economic and demographic assumptions of the 1999 Trustees Report. Additional assumptions are needed on rates of return to equity and corporate bonds to estimate the offset resulting from private accounts in the Archer/Shaw plan and the effect of Trust Fund investments in equity under one variation of the Trust Fund Investment Plan. 9 Following the recommendations of the 1999 Technical Panel to the Social Security Advisory Board, we make the follow- 7 Bosworth and Burtless (2000) ing assumptions regarding the assumed rate of return on equity investments in the Trust Fund and in private accounts:
• Analyses are first presented assuming equities earn the same rate of return as government bonds (a 3 percent annual real return). • An alternative presentation assumes equities earn a real annual return of 6 percent-representing a 3 percentage point equity premium over the return to government bonds.
These two alternative assumptions on the return to equities are made for three reasons. First, presentation in this manner easily allows one to determine the extent to which actuarial balance for any reform package depends on allowing investments in equities relative to investments in government bonds. Second, a portion of the higher return equities have historically earned over government bonds is generally thought by economists to compensate for extra risk. 10 As a simplification, if the "risk-adjusted" return to equities is assumed to be the return on government bonds, then this may be the appropriate rate to use for a risk-adjusted analysis of actuarial balance. 11 Third, some analysts believe future returns to equities are likely to be below their historical average. Use of the government bond rate can be regarded as a "pessimistic case" assumption.
The return to equities assumed in past analyses by the Office of the Actuary and the 1994-96 Social Security Advisory Council has generally been a 7 percent real return. Diamond (1999) notes that a return of this magnitude is an appropriate assumption as a required return to stockholding, but-given current high stock market values relative to corporate earningsthis is greater than the likely future actual return to equities over the next 75 years. 12 The discrepancy Diamond sees between the return required by investors to compensate for the risk of stock holding and the likely future actual return requires a market correction for what he considers to be the present over valuation. Diamond suggests either assuming stock prices immediately decline by 50 percent or decline in real value by 30 percent over the next 10 years, before returning to an annual rate of return of about 7 percent. The difficulty with forecasting a market decline is that such declines cannot be anticipated-if a sufficient number of investors agreed that such a decline would occur in the near future, stocks would immediately decline in value. Further, even if a market decline occurred in the near future, such a decline would have little or no impact on plans that begin investing in equity slowly or delay investment for an initial period. For these reasons, when an equity premium is considered, we adopt the assumption of the 1999 Technical Panel of a 6 percent annual real return to equities as 10 The return on equities in excess of that on riskless assets (the "equity premium") is generally regarded by economists as larger than necessary to compensate for the extra risks of stock holding. For a discussion of this issue, see Siegel and Thaler (1997) and Mehra and Prescott (1985) . 11 Individuals who currently hold both equities and bonds should be indifferent between marginal changes imposing additional stock holding through Social Security reform since they can "unwind" the new requirement through reduced other holdings of equities. For a discussion of the effects of investment in private securities on risk bearing through Social Security, see Mariger (1999) . Diamond and Geanakoplos (1999) show that individuals with no stock holdings can be made better off by a marginal diversification into equities. In 1998 about one-half of the population held stock either directly or indirectly through mutual funds and retirement accounts (Kennickell, Starr-McLuer, and Surette, 2000) . 12 Baker and Weisbrot (1999, ch. 5 ) also make the point that future stock returns must be significantly less than 7 percent if future price-earnings ratios remain constant and one assumes the economic projections of the Trustees Report. Baker and Weisbrot estimate that stock returns over the 75-year period would be only 3.5 percent if the economic projections of the Trustees Report were assumed. the anticipated future return. This return is lower than the historical return to equities and can be thought of as assuming a reduced future risk premium to stock holding or corrections for possible current over valuation. 13 Expense fees for private accounts are based on assumptions of the 1994-96 Social Security Advisory Council. Individual accounts modeled after the Personal Security Account proposal were assumed by the Advisory Council to incur an expense fee of 1.0 percent. Accounts modeled after the Federal Employee Thrift Savings Plan were assumed to incur an expense fee of 0.10 percent. Fee differences reflect the difference between individually and collectively managed investments. The Social Security actuaries have assumed a 0.25 percent expense fee under the Archer/Shaw plan, reflecting the relatively limited investment options provided under this plan. Expense fees under the Bipartisan Plan are assumed to be 0.10 percent, reflecting the collective management of these funds. 14
Overview
Figures 1 and 2 present the Trust Fund ratio (beginning of year Trust Fund balance over outlays during the year) for current law and the four reform options assuming no equity premium and a 3 percent equity premium, respectively. As seen in Figure 1 , in the absence of an equity premium, the Social Security Guarantee Plan would extend the solvency of the OASDI Trust Fund by less than 10 years. Trust Fund ratios under the Moynihan and Bipartisan plans remain positive and stable throughout the 75-year period. The Trust Fund Investment Plan, while having a positive Trust Fund ratio throughout the 75-year period, is on a downward trajectory and would likely result in Trust Fund insolvency sometime after 2070.
With the assumed 3 percent equity premium, Figure 2 shows the Social Security Guarantee Plan results in positive Trust Fund ratios throughout the 75-year period. The downward pattern in the Trust Fund ratio toward the end of the 75-year period for this plan is due to the assumed reductions in the payroll tax rate. The Trust Fund Investment Plan with equity investment has the greatest Trust Fund ratio of any reform plan in each year if equities are credited with their higher historic yield.
The remainder of this section analyzes the elements of each reform plan in more detail. 15 Social Security Guarantee Plan (Archer/Shaw)
The Social Security Guarantee Plan relies on the combination of the contribution of General Fund revenues to private accounts and their investment at higher private rates of return to restore solvency to the Trust Fund without reducing benefits to any individual. In the absence of rates of return above those on government bonds, the Plan does not achieve actuarial balance. If returns in private accounts include the assumed equity premium of 3 percent (and the corporate bond premium of 0.5 percent), Trust Fund surpluses are sufficient to provide for a reduction in future payroll tax rates. Table 3A shows the effect of this plan on the 75-year actuarial balance assuming private accounts earn only the government bond rate of return. Under the offset in this plan, benefits paid to individuals from the Trust Fund are reduced by the annuity payable from the private account. Although in present value the effects of this reform option on Trust Fund operations should be similar to providing additional Trust Fund revenues equal to 2 percent of taxable payroll, the effects will differ for any fixed period of years because the offset occurs later in any individual's life than would the alternative of a tax increase. The reform plan is shown to result in a 75-year OASDI actuarial deficit of 0.71 percent of taxable payroll-a decline of 1.35 percent of taxable payroll. (The alternative of a 2 percent increase in payroll tax rates would reduce the actuarial deficit by 2.00 percent.) Given the deficit, the future payroll tax rate reductions are assumed to not be implemented.
Alternatively, at the assumed equity premium of 3 percent, the offset under the Social Security Guarantee Plan results in a 75-year OASDI surplus of 0.39 percent of taxable payroll. The surplus is sufficient to provide for a payroll tax rate reduction of 1.5 percentage points in 2050 and an additional 1 percentage point in 2060. After these payroll tax rate reductions, the Trust Funds would be just in actuarial balance over the 75-year period. Table 3B provides the actuarial effects of the separate components of this plan under the assumed equity rate of return. 16
Trust Fund Investment Plans
Under the Administration's proposals, the General Fund transfers to Social Security between 2011 and 2044 would eliminate about 40 percent of the longrange (75-year) actuarial deficit. The Trust Fund Investment Plans modify the Administration proposals to illustrate how long-range actuarial balance might be achieved. Table 4 shows the long-range actuarial effect of the Trust Fund Investment Plan assuming the two alternatives on Trust Fund investments. Simply providing the assumed transfers to the Trust Fund and investing them in government securities reduces the 75-year OASDI actuarial deficit by 0.90 percent of taxable payroll. Expanding coverage of Social Security to all new State and local government workers hired after 1999 would improve the actuarial balance by 0.21 percent of taxable payroll. Increasing the taxable wage base to 90 percent of covered wages between 2000 and 2010 (and maintaining it at this percentage thereafter) would improve the actuarial balance by an additional 0.43 percent of taxable payroll. Accelerating the current-law increase in the normal retirement age and increasing it beyond age 67 would increase the actuarial balance by 0.57 percent. These changes together result in an OASDI actuarial surplus of 0.04 percent. In the absence of equity investments (or assuming no equity premium to Trust Fund investments in equity), the Trust Fund is just in actuarial balance.
Further assuming a 3 percent equity premium and allowing equity investments of up to 15 percent of Trust Fund assets increases the 75-year OASDI actuarial balance to 0.27 percent of taxable payroll (Table 4 , line 6). Given this surplus, other provisions of the plan contributing to this surplus could potentially be adjusted downward.
Social Security Solvency Act of 1999 (S. 21, Senator Moynihan)
The factor most significantly improving the actuarial balance under this plan is the one percentage point reduction in the COLA modeled as effective in 2000. 17 The other provisions in the plan, primarily further reductions in future Social Security benefit levels, eliminate the remaining deficit. Overall, the plan would result in a slight 75-year OASDI actuarial surplus of 0.06 percent of taxable payroll. Table 5 provides an analysis of the separate effects of each element of this plan on the Old Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund and the Disability Insurance 17 The legislation provided that this change would be first effective in 1999. Trust Fund. Several of the provisions are described here. The decrease in the COLA would decrease the OASDI actuarial deficit by 1.41 percent of taxable payroll, eliminating about 70 percent of the long-range deficit. Adjusting the PIA factors (that convert covered earnings into benefit amounts) to effectively raise the normal retirement age (NRA) to 70 by 2065 would increase the OASDI actuarial balance by 0.73 percent. By increasing the contribution and benefit base to $99,900 in 2004 (about 86.6 percent of covered earnings, indexed by wage index in the following years), the plan would improve the actuarial balance by 0.15 percent of taxable payroll. The payroll tax changes included in the plan would decrease the OASDI actuarial balance by 0.76 percent (the actuarial effect of decreasing the tax rate through 2029 outweighs the effect of increasing the rates in later years). The remaining provisions included in the plan and their actuarial effects appear in Table 5 . Individual account balances are affected by the assumed rate of return on equities, but because there is no offset between these accounts and the Social Security benefit, Trust Fund balances are unaffected by the assumed rate of return on equities.
Bipartisan Social Security Reform Plan (Senators Gregg, Breaux, Kerrey, and others)
This plan relies on a combination of Social Security benefit reductions and General Fund transfers to achieve long- Table 6 summarizes the impact of each provision of the plan. Accelerating the current-law increase in the normal retirement age to 67, increasing the NRA Reduction Factors and Delayed Retirement Credit, and providing for further adjustments to the PIA factors would improve the OASDI actuarial balance cumulatively by 1.33 percent of taxable payroll. The 0.5 percentage point reduction in the COLA would increase the balance by an additional 0.63 percent. The transfers from the General Fund would improve the actuarial balance by 0.78 percent of taxable payroll. In the absence of any other changes to Social Security the OASDI Trust Funds would have an actuarial surplus of 1.19 percent of taxable payroll. Redirecting 2 percent of payroll taxes to private accounts and decreasing Social Security benefits through the offset feature would decrease the actuarial balance by 0.97 percent of taxable payroll. As described in the second section, the reduction in benefit payments is smaller in present value than the foregone Trust Fund tax revenues and interest earnings. Also, because the benefit reduction occurs at a later date than the loss in tax revenues to the Trust Fund, the fixed 75-year valuation period results in a further measured decline in actuarial balance. The effects of the other provisions in the plan appear in Table 6 .
Because the reduction in Social Security benefits is independent of the rate of return on private accounts, the 75-year actuarial balance is unaffected by variations in the assumed rate of return to equity.
EFFECTS ON REPRESENTATIVE WORKERS
Each of the plans considered in this report would eliminate the 75-year actuarial deficit that exists under current law under the economic assumptions generally employed by the Trustees of the Social Security system. Each plan would affect representative workers differently. This section examines the impact of the plans on several representative workers. Although comparisons are made between the reform plans and current law, it should be kept in mind that current benefit levels are not sustainable in the absence of program changes.
Several measures are used to assess the impact on each individual. First, we report the real annual benefit (which includes amounts from both Social Security and annuitized private accounts) received for an individual retiring at age 65. 18 Second, we report the replacement rate, which is the ratio of the total real benefit received by the worker relative to the worker's final year of earnings before retirement. The replacement rate is calculated at age 65 and age 85. If the real value of Social Security benefits declined over time, the replacement rate at age 65 would exceed the replacement rate at age 85. Third, we report the money's worth ratio, which is the ratio of the present value of the expected total benefits received in retirement to the present value of taxes paid while working. 19 Finally, we report the net dollar advantage, which represents the difference between the present value of expected total retirement benefits and the present value of taxes discounted to the year in which the worker first began contributing to Social Security. All values are in 1999 dollars. Future nominal benefits are converted to 1999 dollars using the CPI assumed in the 1999 Trustees Report. As a result, the proposals in the Moynihan and Bipartisan plans to reduce the COLA (applied to the defined-benefit portion of retirement benefits) below the CPI are described below as causing a decline in the real value of benefits throughout an individual's retirement. Of course, if it is believed that the current CPI overstates the change in the true cost of living for retirees, then some reduction in the COLA could be provided that preserves the real value of benefits throughout retirement. Even in this case, however, the reduction in the COLA would cause a decline in benefits relative to current law, and this relative decline would increase throughout retirement.
This section first examines the effect of each plan on a worker that earned the average wage level over his or her working lifetime. The effect of each proposal over time is provided by examining representative workers retiring at age 65 in 2010, 2020, and 2030 (i.e., workers age 55, 45, and 35 in 2000, respectively) . Similar analyses are conducted for low earners and high earners. 20 The appendix provides figures showing money's worth ratios for workers retiring in all years under each of the four plans. 21
Average Earners
The average earner is assumed to earn a wage equal to the Social Security average wage index over his or her career. In 1999, the average wage is assumed to be $29,732. As illustrated in Table 7 , under current law the average earner retiring at age 65 in 2010 can expect to receive an annual Social Security benefit of $12,639. This benefit level represents 40.3 percent of the worker's salary in the final year of work (2009), and because Social Security benefits are fully indexed for inflation, the replacement rate 20 years after retirement remains the same since the real value of the benefit remains the same. In total, the average earner will pay more into the Social Security system than received from it: the present value of the taxes paid over the worker's career will exceed the present value of expected benefits by $10,703, in 1999 dollars. The ratio of the present value of benefits to the present value of taxes, or the money's worth ratio, is 82.4 percent.
Later retirees will receive a larger benefit ($13,621 for 2020 retirees and $13,961 for 2030 retirees) but a smaller share of the taxes they paid into the system (79.2 percent and 73.2 percent, respectively). These retirees receive larger benefits because the real wages earned over their lifetimes exceed those of the 2010 retiree. 22 The replacement rate, money's worth ratio, and net dollar advantage for the average 65year old retiree decline over time because of differences in the representative workers' wage profiles, payroll tax rates, and changes in the normal retirement age.
Benefits at age 65 are affected over time by changes in the normal retirement age. An individual retiring at age 65 in 2010, when the normal retirement age is 66, will face a smaller reduction in retirement benefits for early retirement than an individual retiring at age 65 in later years when the normal retirement age is higher. For individuals retiring in 2020 and 2030, the normal retirement age is 66 and 2 months and 67, respectively. As later cohorts are expected to have an increased 20 Coronado, Fullerton, and Glass (2000) and Feldstein and Liebman (2000) consider distributional effects of other reform plans. 21 In these figures, the money's worth ratio for current law is the same as under the Social Security Guarantee Plan assuming no equity premium. 22 If nominal wages and prices grew at the same rate, holding all else constant (such as the actuarial reduction for early retirement), real benefit levels would remain the same. Because nominal wage growth is estimated to exceed inflation, real benefits rise. life expectancy, the effect of increases in the normal retirement age on money's worth calculations depends on the increase in the normal retirement age relative to the increase in life expectancy at age 65. Life expectancy at age 65 is estimated to increase by about 6 months every 10 years. Under current law, between 2010 and 2020 the normal retirement age increases by less than the expected increase in life expectancy for an individual at age 65. Between 2020 and 2030 the normal retirement age increases by more than the expected increase in life expectancy.
No Equity Premium
Average earner benefits shown for plans incorporating private accounts reflect the government bond return in Table  7 . As described in the fourth section, the assumption of the government bond return being earned in private accounts can be considered as one way of providing risk-adjustment for higher yielding but riskier securities.
Benefits under the Trust Fund Investment Plan would fall slightly due to increases in the normal retirement age. The Social Security Guarantee Plan (Archer/ Shaw) would match the current-law levels for benefits, replacement rates, and money's worth ratios. The Moynihan plan would cause a decline in each of these measures for the 2010 and 2020 retirees but would eventually provide benefit levels superior to current law through its private accounts. Because the Moynihan plan would reduce the COLA applied to the defined-benefit portion of benefits, the money's worth ratio under the Moynihan plan would be lower than under current law. The Bipartisan Plan would result in lower measures than current law for all cohorts, and would have the lowest -10,703 -14,480 -21,145 -10,703 -14,480 -21,145 -11,892 -18,794 -24,106 -15,327 -22,795 -25,395 -17,252 -27,160 -31,650 Source: Actuarial Research Corporation Social Security Model. money's worth ratios of the four plans considered. Apart from the Moynihan plan, each of the other plans relies on significant transfers from the General Fund to either the Trust Fund or to private accounts. To the degree that such transfers are effectively financed through increases in income (or other) taxes (or smaller reductions in such taxes than otherwise), workers could be adversely affected. The items reported (real annual benefit, replacement rate, money's worth ratio, and net dollar advantage) exclude the effects of non-payroll taxes and therefore offer an incomplete assessment of the total effect of a plan on after-tax income to the extent that taxes other than payroll taxes are altered.
For example, the Moynihan plan increases the taxation of Social Security benefits in retirement, reducing the after-tax value of benefits for some beneficiaries. 23 A complete measure of the effects of these reform plans on workers would require additional assumptions on how other taxes would otherwise have been reduced (or how an increase is required to be made) and how these are distributed over different income groups.
Equity Premium
Additional description of the effects of these plans on benefits of the average earner assuming an equity premium of 3 percent is presented below and in Table 8 . 23 Similar effects can occur under the Social Security Guarantee Plan and the Bipartisan Plan if private account distributions are taxed more heavily than Social Security benefits. -10,703 -14,480 -21,145 -10,703 -14,480 -21,145 -11,892 -18,794 -24,106 -14,852 -20,993 -20,773 -16,628 -24,877 -25,792 Source: Actuarial Research Corporation Social Security Model. This plan would leave the average earner unaffected relative to current law. Although private accounts would be established for individuals with 2 percent of their wages, the annuity amounts received from these accounts would decrease Social Security benefits on a dollar-for-dollar basis. The average earner who retired in 2010 at the age of 65 would receive a real annual annuity payment of $693. 24 With no private account, the individual would have received $12,639, so net of the offset, the individual would receive $11,946 in Social Security benefits. The total benefit remains the same, but the composition would change to include the private account annuity.
Over time, the share of the total benefit represented by the private account annuity would increase because the account would have more time to accumulate. For retirees in 2010, the private account annuities would represent 5 percent of the total retirement benefit. For the 2020 retiree, the annuity would represent 13 percent of the total, and for 2030 retirees, 25 percent.
Replacement rates, money's worth ratios, and the net dollar advantage would remain identical to current law because the total retirement benefit and taxes for these workers would remain the same under the Plan. Although the Plan would decrease the payroll tax rate beginning in 2050, none of the representative workers described here would benefit since each would be retired before the tax cut was implemented.
Trust Fund Investment Plans: Equity Premium
Benefits in this plan are not affected by the assumed rate of return to equities. All measures are the same as at the government bond return assumed in Table 7 .
Social Security Solvency Act of 1999 (S. 21, Senator Moynihan): Equity Premium This plan would decrease the amount that average earners would receive in Social Security benefits through a variety of program changes. Assuming a 3 percent equity premium, the additional benefits received from private accounts, however, may result in total benefits in excess of the current-law Social Security benefit, especially for currently younger workers in their initial years of retirement. The analysis presented here assumes that individuals would contribute to private accounts the amounts saved by the payroll tax cut implemented by the plan. Individual and employer-matched annual contributions would total 1 percent of covered wages in 2000-01 and 2 percent in 2002-29.
For the average earner retiring in 2010, total retirement benefits would decline relative to current law. Rather than annually receiving $12,639 under current law, the average earner would receive $12,526 under the Moynihan plan, $584 of which would be from the private account. The money's worth ratio would fall to 75.5 percent.
For the average earner retiring in 2010, the Social Security benefit would be about 5 percent less than under current law. Two provisions are responsible for this decline. First, under current law, benefit levels are determined when a potential retiree reaches age 62. 25 That level is then adjusted by the COLA to the level the individual will receive at retirement, assumed here to be at age 65. The percentage point decrease in the COLA under the plan would result in a smaller increase in benefits between ages 62 and 65. Second, the effective increase in the retirement age, which is 66 under current law in 2010 but would effectively be about 4 months greater under the Moynihan plan in 2010, would cause a 65-year old retiree to have a slightly greater reduction in benefits for early retirement.
The COLA adjustment also would cause the real value of the defined-benefit portion of benefits to decline over time once an individual has retired. 26 By age 85, the COLA reduction would cause nearly a 20 percent decline in the value of the defined-benefit portion of benefits. The private account benefit, modeled here as a constant real annuity payment, would not be affected by this change. As a result of the COLA reduction, retirement benefits as a percentage of final year's salary would decline to 33.2 percent at age 85 relative to the 39.9 percent replacement rate at age 65 (in 2010).
For average earners retiring in 2020, the difference between the current-law levels and the proposed levels are slightly greater. The decrease in the Social Security benefit would continue to exceed the annuity payable from the private account. Rather than receiving the $13,621 annual current-law benefit, the average earner retiring in 2020 would receive $13,011 under the Moynihan plan, including the $1,574 annual annuity from the private account. The money's worth ratio would fall to 69.8 percent.
By 2030, the annuity payments from the private accounts of the Moynihan plan would initially more than offset the decline in the Social Security benefits relative to current law. The average earner would receive a total retirement benefit of $15,255 under the plan, significantly higher than the $13,961 current-law ben-efit. The replacement rate at age 65 would rise to 40.9 percent compared to the current-law level of 37.4 percent. However, by the time the individual reached 85, the real value of the benefit would have fallen due to the COLA reduction applied to the defined-benefit portion of benefits such that the replacement rate was less than the current-law rate. Although the real value of the total retirement benefit would decline over the individual's retirement, the higher benefit in the initial years of retirement relative to current law would slightly exceed the reduction in later years. The money's worth ratio of the Moynihan plan for this retiree exceeds the currentlaw level (73.7 percent relative to 73.2 percent).
Bipartisan Social Security Reform Plan: Equity Premium
Payments from private accounts under this plan supplement a reduced Social Security benefit. 27 Unlike the Moynihan plan, even those average earners who had accumulated amounts in their private accounts for a long period of time would be worse off under the Bipartisan Plan relative to current law. Total benefits under this plan vary with the rate of return earned in private accounts.
As described in the first section, the Plan would decrease Social Security benefits through an offset. The offset is intended to recapture the value of payroll tax revenues redirected to the private accounts, assuming these amounts were invested at a rate of return equal to the growth in nominal wages. The net effect of the offset is that workers would benefit from private accounts to the extent that the rate of return to the private account exceeded the growth in nominal wages. The reduc-26 As noted above, this assumes the currently computed CPI is an accurate measure of inflation. 27 The Bipartisan Plan also provides for a limited government contribution based on voluntary contributions to private accounts by workers with incomes below specified levels. Because contributions to these accounts are uncertain, the analysis presented here assumes that average and low earners receive $100 in their private accounts annually, which represents the amount contributed by the government if a qualifying individual contributes any positive amount to the private account. tion in Social Security benefits from the offset represents a smaller share of the private account proceeds the longer the period over which the worker could contribute to private accounts and the higher the rate of return in the private account. Under the assumed 3 percent equity premium, the level of total retirement benefits under the Bipartisan Plan would be lower than current law and lower than the level under the Moynihan plan. For average earners retiring in 2010, the total retirement benefit would reach $11,586, or $1,053 lower than the current-law Social Security benefit. At retirement, the replacement rate would be 36.9 percent. This rate would decline further throughout retirement as the real value of the definedbenefit portion of benefits fell from the COLA reduction. The replacement rate would fall to 33.7 percent at age 85 (in 2030).
For average earners reaching age 65 and retiring in 2020, the same pattern would hold as for the 2010 retirees. Total retirement benefits would lie below the current-law and Moynihan levels. Relative to 2010 retiree levels, Social Security benefits, replacement rates, and money's worth ratios would be smaller, reflecting the increasing impact of the effective increase in the normal retirement age. The change in the PIA factors to improve the progressivity of benefits would work in the opposite direction, increasing Social Security benefits relative to 2010 retirees.
For retirees in 2030, the accumulations in the private accounts would just about make up for the reductions in Social Security benefits under the Plan. This worker would have contributed to a private account for 30 years, and assuming equity investments in the account earned the assumed equity premium, the worker 's annual Social Security benefit would be reduced by $1,526, about 40 percent of the private account annuity. This offset would cause the total retirement benefit to fall just slightly below the cur-rent-law level. Total retirement benefits, replacement rates, and money's worth ratios would rise relative to those for 2020 retirees. Unlike the Moynihan plan, each of these values would not exceed the current-law value. Although the real value of the total retirement benefit at age 65 would approximately equal the currentlaw level, the COLA reduction applied to the define-benefit portion of benefits would cause it to fall further beneath the current-law level throughout retirement. In total, the money's worth ratio under the Bipartisan Plan would be 67.3 percent, lower than the current-law level of 73.2 percent.
Low Earner
The low earner is assumed to earn 45 percent of the average earner's salary, or 45 percent of the Social Security wage index, over his or her career. In 1999, the low wage is assumed to be $13,380. Table 9 reports the effect on the low earner of each of the plans assuming the government bond rate of return on private account investments. Under current law, an individual retiring in 2010 at the age of 65 and earning this income would receive an annual Social Security benefit of $7,619, which represents 60 percent of the average earner's benefit. The progressive nature of the Social Security benefit calculation results in the low earner receiving a higher replacement rate than the average earner.
Under current law, low earners retiring in 2010 and 2020 have money's worth ratios greater than one (and positive net dollar advantages), signifying that the benefits received in retirement exceed in present value payroll taxes paid in working years.
Just as was observed for the average earner, benefit levels would rise for retirees in 2020 and 2030 under current law, reflecting real income growth, but replacement rates, money's worth ratios, and net dollar advantages would fall. This is because of higher payroll tax rates paid by younger cohorts relative to older cohorts and an increase in the normal retirement age at a rate faster than the increase in expected longevity for these cohorts. By 2030, the reduction of benefits caused by these factors would cause the money's worth ratio to fall below one.
No Equity Premium
Also, as was observed for the average earner, benefits for low earners under the Trust Fund Investment Plan would fall slightly due to increases in the normal retirement age. The Social Security Guarantee Plan (Archer/Shaw) would continue to match the current-law levels for benefits, replacement rates, and money's worth ratios. The Moynihan plan would cause a decline in each of these measures for all cohorts. The Bipartisan Plan would result in lower measures than current law for retirees in 2010 and 2020, but the increased progressivity of the plan in combination with the private account benefits would result in a slightly higher money's worth ratio by 2030 than under current law.
Equity Premium
Additional description of the effects of these plans on benefits of the low earner assuming an equity premium of 3 percent is presented below and in Table 10 .
Social Security Guarantee Plan (Archer/Shaw): Equity Premium
Total retirement benefits, replacement rates, money's worth ratios, and net dollar advantage would coincide with the respective current-law values. The composition of total retirement benefits would differ because of the private accounts. The annuity from the private account for a low earner under the assumed 3 percent equity premium would represent 4 percent of the total retirement benefit for 2010 retirees, but that share would rise to 18 percent for 2030 retirees. For later retirees, it would represent an even larger share. Compared to average earners, the private account annuity is a smaller share of the total benefit because the low earner receives a larger current law Social Security benefit relative to labor earnings (as evidenced by the larger current law replacement rates).
Trust Fund Investment Plans: Equity Premium
Benefit payments under this plan would not vary with the rate of return assumed for Trust Fund investments in equities. Benefit amounts are the same as in Table 9 .
Social Security Solvency Act of 1999 (S. 21, Senator Moynihan): Equity Premium For a low earner under the assumed 3 percent equity premium, this plan would decrease total benefit levels relative to current law for retirees in 2010 and 2020, but increase initial total benefits for retirees by 2030. Social Security benefits would represent a declining share of total benefits as the private account accumulations, and resulting annuities, grew. In terms of levels, Social Security benefits for 2020 retirees would be lower than those for 2010 retirees because of the change in the normal retirement age described above. For retirees in 2010 and 2020, replacement rates, money's worth ratios, and net dollar advantage would decline relative to current law.
Contrary to the results for the average earner, the money's worth ratio for the low wage-earning retiree in 2030 would be lower than the current-law level. Although the total retirement benefit level at age 65 under the Moynihan plan would exceed that under current law and individual contributions into the system would be the same as under current law (workers contribute a combined 12.4 percent to Social Security and the private account), the money's worth ratio declines because the real value of the total retirement benefit drops throughout retirement due to the COLA adjustment.
Bipartisan Social Security Reform Plan: Equity Premium
Under the assumed 3 percent equity premium, the Bipartisan Plan would cause the total retirement benefit, replacement rate, money's worth ratio, and net dollar advantage for the low earner retiring in 2010 to fall slightly below the current-law levels. As mentioned above, the plan decreases Social Security benefits and utilizes private accounts to offset the cuts. Relatively older workers would not have enough time before retirement to accumulate sufficient amounts in their private accounts to match current-law benefits.
Younger workers, however, would have a longer accumulation period and would initially receive larger benefits than under current law. Low earners retiring in 2020 would receive total annual retirement benefits of $8,467; they would have only received $8,212 under current law. Low earners would benefit from the adjustment in the PIA factors that would increase the progressivity of the benefit calculation. Because of the COLA adjustment, the real value of the total retirement benefit would decline once retired. Given the COLA adjustment, only workers retiring in 2030 would have a higher money's worth ratio under this plan (107.0 percent) than they would have under current law (98.1 percent).
Maximum Earners
The third category of representative workers are high earners, who are assumed to earn the current-law maximum taxable wage (in 1999, $72,600) . 28 The level of income earned by the maximum earner is about 250 percent greater than that earned by the average earner. Under current law, the maximum earner retiring in 2010 at the age of 65 would receive an annual Social Security benefit of $19,190, roughly 150 percent of the average earner's benefit.
Because of the progressive structure of the Social Security benefit calculation under current law, the high-wage workers exhibit the lowest replacement rates, money's worth ratios, and net dollar advantage. A maximum earner retiring in 2010 would receive benefits of roughly one-quarter of the prior year's labor income. The present value of the expected lifetime benefits this worker would receive represents 61 percent of the present value of taxes paid.
The replacement rate of a maximum earner retiring in 2020 would increase because of the underlying pattern of the wage base. 29 However, it would decrease for a 2030 retiree, because of the pattern of growth in the maximum taxable wage and the further increase in the normal retirement age (the normal retirement age will be 10 months higher in 2030). Money's worth ratios would decline across cohorts as a result of these effects. Table 11 summarizes the effect of each of the plans on maximum earners assuming private accounts earn the government bond rate of return. As for the average and low earners, benefits under the Trust Fund Investment Plan would fall slightly due to the increase in the normal retirement age. The Social Security Guarantee Plan would continue to provide the same benefits as under current law. The Moynihan plan would provide a lower total retirement benefit for retirees in 2010 and 2020. For retirees in 2030, the private account would initially more than offset the reduced value of the Social Security benefit and would result in a money's worth ratio only slightly below the current-law level. The Bipartisan plan would result in lower total benefits than under current law for all cohorts.
No Equity Premium

Equity Premium
Additional description of the effects of these plans on the maximum earner assuming an equity premium of 3 percent is presented below and in Table 12 .
Social Security Guarantee Plan (Archer/Shaw): Equity Premium
The total retirement benefit for maximum earners would not exceed the current-law level, but the share of the total retirement benefit represented by the private account annuity would rise from 9 percent for 2010 retirees, to 20 percent for 2020 retirees, to 38 percent for 2030 retirees. Because maximum earners would contribute more to private accounts than the low or average earners, more of their total retirement benefit comes from these accounts. As mentioned earlier, average earners would receive 5 percent, 13 percent, and 25 percent from the private account.
Trust Fund Investment Plans: Equity Premium
As described above, benefits under this plan are not affected by the rate of return to equity. Benefits are the same as in Table 11 .
Social Security Solvency Act of 1999 (S. 21, Senator Moynihan): Equity Premium Upon retirement, maximum earners would initially fare better under the Moynihan plan than current law, regardless of the year of retirement, in terms of the total retirement benefit received. Although Social Security benefits would fall below the current-law level for retirees in each year analyzed, the private account annuities would initially more than offset the decrease. For a maximum earner retiring in 2010, the total retirement ben-efit of $19,253 ($1,425 of which comes from the private account) would slightly exceed the current-law benefit of $19,190.
The resulting replacement rates of the retirees at age 65 would exceed the current-law levels, but 20 years into retirement, the COLA adjustment would have eliminated the plan's advantage over current law for those who retired in 2010 and 2020. Only those retiring in 2030 would still have a real benefit greater than the current-law level 20 years after retirement (in 2050).
Money's worth ratios would lie below the current-law level for 2010 and 2020 retirees, but exceed the current-law level for 2030 retirees. These individuals would have contributed to private accounts for a longer period and also enjoyed the higher rates of return for a longer period. The private account would enable younger workers to receive about the -49,012 -75,442 -99,913 -49,012 -75,442 -99,913 -50,818 -82,295 -104,636 -54,451 -81,168 -89,330 benefits, is not a complete analysis of the effect of the reform plans on economic well-being. Most significantly, three of the four reform plans make use of tens of trillions of dollars of General Fund revenues. The reduction in the General Fund surplus requires other non-Social Security taxes to be higher than they might otherwise be. A complete accounting of the effects of these reform plans should consider how these General Fund revenues might otherwise have been used, or how other taxes might otherwise have been reduced, in the absence of these transfers to Social Security.
